Publications
Book
2017. Believable Evidence (Cambridge University Press). buy
Being reviewed by The Philosophical Review and Philosophical Papers
Editorial work
Papers (online versions can be found here)
2017. Believable Evidence (Cambridge University Press). buy
Being reviewed by The Philosophical Review and Philosophical Papers
Editorial work
- forthcoming (with S. Salem) Pluralism, Relativism, and Skepticism. Special Issue of Inquiry (Routledge).
- 2020. Epistemic Decolonisation. Special Issue of Philosophical Papers (Routledge).
- 2018. The Factive Turn in Epistemology (Cambridge University Press). buy
Papers (online versions can be found here)
- 2021. A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth. Erkenntnis. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-021-00435-4.
- 2021. How to Decolonise Knowledge without Relativism. In Khumalo, S. (Ed.) Decolonisation as Democratisation (pp. 24-47, Cape Town: HSRC Press).
- 2020. Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now. Philosophical Papers, 49(2), July 2020.
- 2020. Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10094-z
- 2019. Either Epistemological or Metaphysical Disjunctivism. In Doyle, C., Milburn, J., and Pritchard, D. H. (Eds.) New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism (Routledge).
- 2019. The Duty of Inquiry, or Why Othello was a Fool. In C. Bourne and E. Bourne (Eds.) The Routledge Companion to Shakespeare and Philosophy, (pp. 311-323, London: Routledge).
- 2018. Introduction: The Factive Turn. In V. Mitova (Ed.) The Factive Turn in Epistemology (pp. 1-12, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- 2016. What Do I Care about Epistemic Norms? In M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (Eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals (pp. 199-223, Berlin/ Boston: DeGruyter).
- 2016. Clearing Space for Extreme Psychologism about Reasons. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (3): 293-301.
- 2015. Truthy Psychologism about Evidence. Philosophical Studies 172 (4): 1105-1126.
- 2012. Age and Agency. Philosophical Papers 41(3): 335-369.
- 2011. Epistemic Motivation: Towards a Metaethics of Belief. In Reisner, A. and Steglich-Petersen, A. (Eds.) Reasons for Belief (pp. 54-74, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- 2011. Knowledge, Virtue, and Epistemic Motives. Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Kirchberg am Wechsel.
- 2011. La Normatividad de la Creencia. Translated by M. Fernandez, Valores Epistémicos, edited by M. Fernandez and M. Valdés (pp. 325-336, México: IIFs-UNAM).
- 2009. A Quasi-Pragmatist Explanation of our Ethics of Belief. Teorema, 28(3): 113-130.
- 2008. Why W. K. Clifford was a Closet Pragmatist. Philosophical Papers, 37(3): 471-489.
- 2008. Why Pragmatic Justifications of Epistemic Norms don’t Work. South African Journal of Philosophy, 27(2): 141-152.
- 2005. The Value of Epistemic Norms. South African Journal of Philosophy, 24(2).
Last updated: 16.11.2020